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SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
UNCORPORATIONS
Jesse Finfrock*
Eric Talley**
Larry Ribstein’s pioneering analysis of alternative business
forms during the late twentieth century highlighted the contractarian
freedom that these forms provided. The rise of the LLC model was of
particular interest to Ribstein, who assessed how this model brought
greater freedom to those who held duties and obligations within the
corporate structure. This Article takes up Ribstein’s mantle by assessing the development the alternative “social enterprise” business
forms manifested in benefit corporations (BC) and flexible purpose
corporations (FPC). Both forms allow an incorporated entity to articulate and pursue a social benefit alongside the maximization of
shareholder returns. Despite its utility, the uptake of the social enterprise corporation, as assessed through a case study of California, appears underwhelming. Yet, by using the arc of the LLC uptake path
as a comparative historical benchmark, the authors argue that there is
hope that these new social enterprise corporations will see an increasing rate of uptake in the future.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Few modern corporate law scholars will ever come close to matching the intellectual breadth and depth of the late Larry Ribstein. In his
countless interactions with academics, practitioners, and policymakers
over three decades, Ribstein invariably added something new and insightful. In this Article, we celebrate Ribstein’s storied and rich career
by drawing inspiration from one dimension of his scholarship that has
proven enormously influential and is durable to this day: the rise of the
so-called “uncorporation.” Over the course of a decade, Ribstein and
coauthors documented the growth and role of new business forms that
dominated the late twentieth century, including LLCs, LLPs, S Corporations, Limited Partnerships, and other permutations. These statutory innovations, he successfully argued, facilitated tremendous contractarian
benefits to entrepreneurs, affording them a “menu” of choices from
which to select in an effort to tailor their own legal and governance traits
to their peculiar business circumstances. Their prevalence today is, in
part, a testament to his insights.
It is perhaps no surprise that at approximately the same time as
Ribstein’s passing, several states began to promulgate more tailored governance innovation that further expands contractarian freedom over the
duties and obligations residing within a corporate structure: the creation
of alternative “social enterprise” business forms, which require the incorporated entity to articulate a broader social goal (or goals) against
which—alongside profitability—corporate performance is to be assessed.
Often operating under names such as the “Benefit Corporation” (“BC”)
or “Flexible Purpose Corporation” (“FPC”), these alternative forms are
designed to provide a concrete means by which a corporation can bind
itself to a broader set of purposes, without also having to go “all in” with
nonprofit (or low-profit) status. As of this writing, approximately half
the states and the District of Columbia have implemented legislation
creating these new corporate forms, and many others are in various stages of promulgation. A national experiment is decidedly underway.
In the pages below, we follow Ribstein’s pioneering lead with other
uncorporated forms to provide a preliminary empirical assessment on the
results of the social enterprise experiment. While most who knew him
would readily agree that the social enterprise sector was not Ribstein’s
particular cup of tea (a likely understatement), for this same reason we
view our analysis of this type of alternative business form as a fitting
homage to Ribstein’s persuasive influence and breadth in the field.
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Although our discussion is national in scope, we focus our sharpest
attention on California. This focus is partially based on the granular data
available to us, but we also have chosen California because of the state’s
economic prominence, its current position as the state with the most uncorporated entities already in existence, and the unique “miniexperiment” that California undertook: the simultaneous passage of two
different types of social enterprise business forms (BC and FPC) in 2012.
We find that both in California and overall, there have been a (numerically) modest number of companies that have embraced these alternative
business forms. At the same time, however, we argue that it is far too
early to declare the experiment stalled or unsuccessful. Indeed, the rate
of statutory diffusion as well as firm-level adoption of these forms has
thus far outstripped one of the most prominent historical benchmarks:
the rise of the Limited Liability Company during the 1980s and 1990s,
documented so comprehensively by Ribstein himself. By this historical
comparison, in fact, we demonstrate that social enterprises have enjoyed
significant success thus far. Only time (and additional empirical attention) will fully reveal the ultimate value added of these innovations, of
course; we nevertheless conjecture (even on the basis of what is currently
available) that the experiment has been almost certainly worthwhile.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides
a general overview of social entrepreneurship forms, contrasting them
with what was possible under other business organizational choices. Part
III gives a brief empirical overview of the California experiment (the
reader is directed to another recent article for more granular details1).
Part IV endeavors to assess the empirical data, particularly in relation to
other benchmarks (such as LLCs). Part V concludes.
II. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP FORMS
Before delving into our empirical enterprise, we begin by providing
some backstory, focusing on why such business entity forms were
thought (at least by some) necessary to begin with.
A.

The Status Quo Ante

Prior to the enactment of social enterprise legislation, traditional
corporations in California faced a troublingly limited set of options if
they wished to articulate and pursue a social benefit mission alongside
maximizing shareholder returns.
The first limitation was the state’s enabling statute setting the formal requirements for corporate formation. Although many statutes
(such as Delaware’s) permit corporate entities great freedom to tailor
their articulated corporate purpose (in the charter), including social ben1. Eric Talley, Corporate Form and Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report from California
(and Beyond) (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2144567, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144567.
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efit goals,2 others (including California’s) are less generous. Due to an
odd quirk in California corporate law, the state does not permit flexibility in the statement of a corporate purpose within a corporate charter,
constraining incorporators instead to utilize a stock set of phrases that do
not clearly admit social entrepreneurship goals.3 In addition, California
never adopted a (so-called) “constituency” statute, which would permit
(or even require) directors to weigh costs and benefits of their decisions
across a large number of constituencies, including shareholders, corporate stakeholders, and society.4 These immutable prescriptions of the
statute essentially made it impossible for a for-profit Californiaincorporated firm to embrace social entrepreneurship goals in its core
governing constitution.
For aspiring California social entrepreneurs, incorporating in another state (i.e., one allowing greater flexibility in articulating corporate
purposes or offering a constituency statute) could provide a partial route
out of this box. But for truly California-based firms, even this route often proved a pyrrhic victory, as many of the state’s corporate law provisions apply to non-California corporations anyway, through the state’s
infamous long arm statute.5 Similarly, embracing other socially oriented
business forms, such as nonprofit status or L3Cs, posed multiple issues
related to the explicit subordination (or elimination) of profit motive,
awkward tax considerations, and the concomitant difficulty of attracting
third party capital investors.
Consequently, prior to the new statutory innovations in social enterprise forms, many (if not most) socially minded California businesses
tended to incorporate as domestic “plain vanilla” C-corporations, falling
back substantially (and perhaps optimistically) on their managerial discretion and the (so-called) business judgment rule (“BJR”)—a legal presumption that grants great deference to fiduciaries in weighing the costs
and benefits of business decisions, without fear of judicial second guessing. While the deference embodied in the BJR is comforting, it is also
limited in a major respect: While the rule grants fiduciaries discretion
about how to serve their shareholder interests, it arguably does not give
discretion about whether to do so. Consequently, for decisions that patently sacrifice shareholder welfare for the benefit of other considerations (including social purposes), even the BJR provides wavering protection. Such clear tradeoffs between shareholder value and other goals
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit 8, §§ 101–02 (2014).
3. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(b) (West 2014) (prescribing specific language for a general
corporate purpose, and specifically prohibiting expansions of that purpose).
4. Although thirty states currently have such statutes, they are absent from both the California
and Delaware codes for C-corporations. For a state-by-state accounting, see Jonathan D. Springer,
Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (1999).
5. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2014). The Delaware Supreme Court declared Section 2115
to be unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds in VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v.
Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Del. 2005). Since the VantagePoint holding, no California court
has recognized it as binding on California courts, though some recent decisions have acknowledged it
in passing. See, e.g., Lidow v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
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are often manifest at “watershed” junctures in the life of a corporation,
such as when a corporate entity enters “Revlon” mode, putting itself up
for sale or reorganization in a fashion that will cause (usually public)
shareholders to surrender their ability to extract a control premium for
their shares.6 Here, the dictates of corporate law tend to give corporate
fiduciaries little choice but to take appropriate steps to maximize shareholders’ short term value and accept the highest offer reasonably available. Many other concerns (including social benefit goals) tend to fade
quickly when scrutinized against this stark judicial calculus.
Finally, even assuming away all the above constraints, many reform
proponents perceived existing corporate structures as providing inadequate means for making credible, long term commitments to a social
purpose that remains immune to “mission creep.” In other words, if
market conditions were to become too tempting or the demands of shorttermism too pressing, proponents argued, the corporation could too easily redefine its mission through charter/bylaw amendments, restructurings, dissolutions, asset sales, or acquisitions, abandoning any purpose
that did not contribute directly to attractive quarterly P&Ls.
Legal reform advocates, therefore, perceived this status quo ante to
be inadequate for the needs of at least some socially motivated entrepreneurs, their employees, and their prospective investors, who wished to
pursue profitable ventures without having to sacrifice their company’s
defining commitment to broader social goals, such as environmental sustainability, public health, and poverty elimination. Drawing momentum
from the preexisting efforts at reform in other states, the California BC
and FPC statutes were soon to follow.
B.

The California Reforms

Although some reform in California seemed inevitable, the state’s
ultimate decision to embrace two distinct social enterprise corporate
forms was somewhat more surprising. Although a working group focused on stimulating social entrepreneurship in California originally began drafting unified legislation, the group eventually split into two
camps. This divide persisted, ultimately leading to two bills that, while
substantially similar in many respects, differed in some important ways.
As noted above, both the BC and FPC statutes in California require
the corporation to articulate in its charter a public purpose (or purposes)
beyond shareholder value, and to issue annual reports summarizing and
assessing the corporation’s fealty to that articulated purpose. Moreover,
6. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Although California courts are sometimes said to have “rejected” the Revlon doctrine, the evidence for
this claim is scant. Indeed, there appears to be no published opinion by a California state court at any
level that rejects the doctrine, and the one published opinion that cites Revlon appears to do so approvingly. Kirschner Bros. Oil, Inc. v. Natomas Co., 229 Cal. Rptr. 899, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Revlon in reaffirming the “board's duty to its equity shareholders to maximize the sale price of the
company”).
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both statutes require a supermajority vote of shareholders (set by default
at two-thirds) to alter, repeal, reorganize out of, or otherwise jettison the
special purpose provision(s). Nevertheless, the two forms differ in a few
important respects. First, FPCs give somewhat greater freedom to tailor
and articulate special purposes in the charter, while the BC purpose is
somewhat more structured around a broad social purpose, defined as “a
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole . . . .”7 In addition, the statutes differ in the process by which fidelity to the broader social purpose is measured and assessed. For example,
although both require the production of annual reports, the assessment
within a BC report must be conducted in accordance with an established,
documented and measurable third party standard; the FPC form, in contrast, permits greater latitude in assessing performance. Third, embedded in the BC statute is also a form of traditional constituency statute,
requiring the directors to consider the impacts of any action or proposed
action upon various stakeholders of the corporation, such as customers
and employees.8 The FPC statute does not contain a like provision. Furthermore, the BC statute creates a new type of “Benefit Enforcement
Proceeding” (filed by a director, shareholder, or significant equity holder) while the FPC statute relies on traditional enforcement rights (and, in
particular, the derivative action). Moreover, many of the core attributes
typifying the California BC structure also carry over to other states’ BC
statutes (albeit with some exceptions9)—a similarity no doubt catalyzed
by the national scope and messaging of reform-minded corporations like
B-Lab.
By contrast, the FPC entails a somewhat greater degree of (for want
of a better term) flexibility on organizational/governance dimensions
than does the BC form, and it therefore represents the more modest departure from the traditional corporate form. Such flexibility likely entails both benefits and costs. As to the former, FPCs are more likely to
have a “look and feel” similar to other for-profit startups, a resemblance
that may (in some circumstances) attract more financing interest from
sources who value legal predictability and familiarity with existing corporate legal standards.10 On the other hand, by committing to independent
third party accountability standards and creating a new enforcement action, the BC form makes an arguably more concrete commitment that
may be less susceptible to mission creep. A disadvantage that both forms
face in some degree is their institutional novelty, and the lack of a well
settled jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation and application of the
underlying statutes, as well as the development of best practices in the
7. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(b)(3)(c) (West 2014). Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b), with
§ 14610(b). BCs may also adopt specific social purposes in addition to a broad one. Id.
8. Id. at § 14620(b).
9. For example, many other states (but not California) include requirements for director seats
or officer titles dedicated to the pursuit of the public benefit.
10. See, e.g., Susan Mac Cormac & Heather Haney, New Corporate Forms: One Viable Solution
to Advancing Environmental Sustainability, 24 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 1, 49–58 (2012).
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operation and management of both forms. In this respect, it seems plausible that the BC form—by virtue of its relatively more established presence in other states—is likely to generate a more robust quantity of judicial opinions in the short to medium term.11 Only time will reveal, of
course, which of these relative costs and benefits will ultimately win the
day (and for what type of form).
III. THE 2012 CALIFORNIA NUMBERS
The California Secretary of State’s office is the repository for all incorporations under California law. During 2012, according to the Secretary’s staff, there were over 60,000 new incorporations (regardless of
corporate form). Given the novelty of the new statutory reforms, moreover, the Secretary’s staff allowed us to work with them to track all new
incorporations that specifically have opted into Benefit- or FlexiblePurpose-Corporation form for all of 2012 (as well as the first quarter of
2013). Most of our analysis concentrates on the first full year of effectiveness. In addition to assembling a list of BC and FPC incorporations,
we also obtained the filings of each of these corporations, whether executed through an original charter, an amendment to an existing charter,
or a conversion from a traditional corporation.12 We are relatively confident that our sample includes the entire universe of California BCs and
FPCs by the end of 2012.
Figure 1 provides raw counts of BC and FPC incorporations within
California during the calendar year. As illustrated by this Figure, a total
of 104 corporate entities were organized under one of the two new statutes (a number that has now grown somewhat since). Although large
enough a group to be analyzed statistically in a meaningful way, this is
still a small number in the larger picture, constituting less than two-tenths
of a percent of the new incorporations within California during the same
period of time.

11. It bears noting, however, that FPC-like statutes have also recently been proposed and adopted in a number of states. See, e.g., Cass Brewer, Social Enterprise Law Update and Map,
SOCENTLAW (Aug. 11, 2014), http://socentlaw.com/2014/08/social-enterprise-law-update-and-map.
12. For a list of incorporations, as well as links to their filings, see BERKELEY CENTER FOR LAW,
BUSINESS AND THE ECONOMY, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/bclbe.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
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As Figure 1 further shows, entities choosing to file under one of the
two new statutory forms preferred the BC form on nearly a four-to-one
basis over the FPC. Neither the reasons behind this preference nor
whether this preference will persist over time is entirely clear. Because
the BC form was backed by a far larger and more cohesive national corporate reform movement, it should perhaps not be surprising that it enjoyed greater popularity among clients (and their attorneys) upon promulgation.
Figure 2 perhaps provides a small window into this question, tracking incorporations on a monthly basis throughout 2012. This Figure suggests that the strong preference for the BC over the FPC was particularly
marked during the first few months in which the statutes were effective,
possibly suggesting an “inventorying” phenomenon, in which prospective
BCs were already queued for incorporation before the statute’s effective
date. 13 In later months, while the BC still appears to maintain a narrow
advantage, the FPC has retained some popularity.

13. Many of the nineteen BCs incorporated in January, for example, appear to have been executed by a small number of attorneys, which may be a byproduct of concerted marketing efforts by BC
proponents. This is but one of many possibilities, however, and the data does not currently permit
testing of it.
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As a whole, however, neither form enjoyed what might be called an explosion of popularity as the year progressed. Moreover, given that there
were over 60,000 new statutory business entities created in 2012 alone in
California, it is reasonable to question whether the numbers thus far represent much of a success at all. It is to this question we now turn.
As the discussion above suggests, the number of California businesses that have incorporated as a BC or FPC is numerically modest,
even as it included some well-known firms (such as the outdoor clothing
and gear company Patagonia).14 The first quarter calendar year 2013 did
not add much to the mix. There were a total of 115 of either type of firm
formed up to the end of the first quarter in 2013.15 And, by the time of
this writing, 185 California-based BCs are listed on the BC informational
website16 (We are still compiling data on uptake of FPCs during the remainder of 2013). By comparison, the number of companies that form as
other entities in California dwarfs these numbers: California BCs and
FPCs formed in year one amount to less than one-fifth of one percent of
all companies filing formation documents in that year. When viewed in
this light, it appears that California clearly got off to a slow start.

14. Data available from authors upon request.
15. Data available from authors upon request.
16. See Find a Benefit Corp, BENEFIT CORP INFORMATION CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/finda-benefit-corp (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
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IV. INTERPRETING THE EMPIRICAL STATE OF PLAY
It is fair, given the relatively modest numbers described above, for
one to question whether the social enterprise business forms recently
promulgated by California and elsewhere have been much of a success at
all. Although we are (in some ways) sympathetic to this type of academic skepticism, one must be careful about being too quick to make definitive pronouncements early on in an experiment. This caution is particularly warranted in statutory experiments: indeed, virtually any time a new
statutory framework emerges, significant uncertainties invariably attend
how private parties, financiers, regulators, courts, and other policy makers are likely to receive the innovation. Even mildly risk averse entrepreneurs may have some inclination to delay their embrace of social entrepreneurship forms, waiting to observe the fates of early adopters—the
proverbial canaries in the business entity coalmine. Three aspects of the
current state of play suggest that the jury is almost certainly out on
whether the ongoing experiment will reap significant rewards. We discuss them below.
A.

California’s Quick Ascent

First it is important to note that when measured against other states’
uptake numbers, California quickly took the lead, with roughly thirty
percent of the total number of U.S. BCs registered in the state, currently
185 (by our count) of 1121 total.17 In New York, which enacted its BC
law on the same date as California, only twenty-four BCs are currently
registered.18 Similarly, Maryland, which was the first state to enact a BC
law in 2010, attracted only thirty-nine BCs and Benefit LLCs in the first
three years, and currently there are roughly eighty-eight registered
there.19 California’s only close rival appears to be Delaware, where the
vast majority of U.S. public companies are registered, and where fiftyfive companies elected to become BCs in the first three months since the
August 2013 enactment of the “public benefit corporation,” and 121
companies are currently registered.20 These companies include several
nationally established companies like Method Products and Plum Organics. This state-to-state comparison suggests that the uptake in California
may not be as poor as thought; or at the very least that uptake is no less
popular than it is in other states.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.; Alicia Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?,
14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 2 (2014). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 361–68, available at
http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc15; Press Release, State of Del., Governor Markell Registers
Delaware’s First Public Benefit Corporations (Aug. 1, 2013), available at http://news.delaware.gov/
2013/08/01/governor-markell-registers-delawares-first-public-benefit-corporations.
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Finding Appropriate Benchmarks

Second, it may be helpful to juxtapose the ongoing experiment in
social enterprise forms not to the well-developed market for traditional
incorporations, but rather to an historical case study, which can provide
perspective and a benchmark for assessment. An obvious candidate, and
one studied at great length by Professor Ribstein, concerns a slightly less
recent (but significant and widespread) “experiment” in new business
forms: the rise of the LLC model.21 As we argue below, when examined
from this perspective, social entrepreneurship forms have—if anything—
enjoyed greater popularity than the early LLC models. We subdivide
our assessment into (1) state level diffusion measures and (2) firm level
uptake.
Consider first the diffusion of social entrepreneurship business statutes across different states, in comparison to the adoption of LLCs that
began over three decades ago.22 In March 1977, Wyoming became the
first state to enact an LLC law. As Kobayashi and Ribstein point out,
“[i]n the fifteen year period between 1977 and the end of 1991, only eight
states had passed limited liability company statutes.”23 Florida, the second state to pass an LLC statute, waited until 1982, and Colorado, the
third state, waited another eight years until 1990.24 Kobayashi and
Ribstein point to a consequential tax ruling in 198825 that helped establish
greater security of the LLC’s passthrough status, at which point the
floodgates opened substantially; “forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia had passed limited liability company statutes by the end of
1994.”26 By the start of 1997, every state had enacted a version of an
LLC statute.27
By comparison, the rise of the new social enterprise forms seems
quite fast. In the not quite four years since Maryland first promulgated
its BC statute, twenty-seven states and Washington DC have passed a
version of the law including: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
21. See generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2009).
22. Analysis inspired by Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous
Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464
(1996).
23. Id. at 470 n.24 (noting that only Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont had not enacted
LLCs).
24. See id.; Alejandro Miyar, New Year Bulletin: Florida’s Revised LLC Act, LAW IN THE
SUNSHINE STATE (Jan. 7, 2014), http://floridalaw.foxrothschild.com/corporations/new-year-bulletinfloridas-revised-llc-act/; Gary S. Joiner, Choosing the Best Form for Your Colorado Business Entity,
FRASCONA, JOINER, GOODMAN AND GREENSTEIN, P.C., http://www.frascona.com/resource/gsj103
entity.htm.
25. Id. See also Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed
Business Tax Structure, in BUS. TAX STORIES, 295, 296 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005).
26. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 22, at 470.
27. Hamill, supra note 25, at 297. See State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORPORATION
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Sept.
5, 2014).
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Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Washington
DC.28 Moreover, the rate of state uptake cannot—like the LLC’s
growth—be tied to a watershed legal/regulatory ruling. Indeed, what is
notable about the current state of play is just how few bona fide precedents there are in this area. Thus, if one were to take statutory diffusion
rates across state jurisdictions as a primary benchmark of “success,” the
LLC got off to a significantly slower start than have social enterprises.
Another vantage point from which to assess success is the historical
firm level uptake of the LLC form relative to social enterprise forms.
Here again, the available data suggest that LLCs got off to a much slower
start. Wyoming, for instance, enacted its LLC law specifically for a single
oil company,29 and for the next decade averaged a meager four LLCs per
year.30 Florida, which enacted its law five years after Wyoming and was
hoping to attract new capital, attracted only two LLCs within in the first
year.31 In fact, as Susan Hamill notes, over the first decade—“before the
entity finally received partnership status” in 1988—fewer than one hundred LLCs had formed.32
Keatinge and Ribstein identify this lagging uptake pace as “a result
of the lingering uncertainty as to both the tax treatment and the protection of the entity’s members from personal liability.”33 In particular, uptake did not begin to rise until the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 88-76 in
1988, which classified LLCs as partnerships granting them favorable tax
treatment and jumpstarting their rise to prominence around the country.34 In 1994, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 95-10, allowing LLCs
“to enjoy the same flexible standards as limited partnerships when applying the classification regulations.”35 The IRS finalized the rules in 1996,
making permanent the LLC partnership classification for tax purposes;
these rules still apply today.36
The effect of the 1988 Revenue Ruling was dramatic. Prior to the
ruling the yearly number of LLC formations was in single digits; however, after the ruling, states saw a great number of filings in the first year
after enacting the LLC. For example, in the first year and half after
Arizona enacted its law in 1992,37 1336 LLCs were formed within the
28. See State by State Legislative Status, supra note 27.
29. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW 375, 383–84, n.45 (1992) (citing Thomas N. Long, The Wyoming Limited Liability
Company 9–10 (1989) (unpublished paper) (on file with Wyoming Secretary of State)); see also
Hamill, supra note 25, at 307 (identifying the Hamilton Brothers Oil Company as inventing the LLC
model in Wyoming).
30. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate
Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 403 n.46 (1996).
31. Keatinge et al., supra note 29, at 383–84 n.45.
32. Hamill, supra note 30, at 402.
33. Keatinge et al., supra note 29, at 383–84.
34. Hamill, supra note 25, at 302.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 303.
37. Arizona enacted LLC law in June 1992. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601 et seq. (2014).
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state, as compared to the single digit uptake seen in Wyoming and Florida after their respective LLC promulgations.38
This fast growth continued throughout the 1990s. In 1993, when the
IRS first began a census of LLCs, there were 17,335 LLCs registered with
the IRS—1.2 percent of the total number of registered companies.39 By
1998, the number of LLCs had skyrocketed to over twenty-five percent
of the total number of companies, an impressive feat by any measure of
uptake.40 This growth pattern—years of stagnation followed by sudden
upsurge once regulatory uncertainties are clarified—similarly counsels
caution in interpreting early data on social enterprises.
Moreover, even if one were to “stack the deck” and assume that
LLCs grew faster than they actually did in early years, the individual
takeup rates of social enterprises would still (by our estimate) compare
favorably. Consider Figure 3 below, which depicts a specimen exponential growth curve of the population of LLCs across firms from its year of
first inception in Wyoming (1977) through the first reliable economic
census of LLCs (1993). The Figure assumes—contrary to fact—that (1)
LLCs grew at a constant exponential rate between those years, and (2)
that there were fifty LLCs formed in the first year of promulgation in
Wyoming. Both assumptions that clearly overestimate early uptake of
the LLC form given the discussion above, and thus both lean decidedly
in the direction of overestimating LLC takeup. Nevertheless, as the figure suggests, the imputed population of LLCs in the fourth year postpromulgation (around 150) still falls far short of the current population
of statutory social entrepreneurship forms (which by our count is around
1200 nationwide). Indeed, in California alone, the total number of such
forms already exceeds the imputed amount given in the figure.

38. ACC Entity Formation Statistics, KEYT LAW, LLC, http://www.keytlaw.com/azllclaw/forming
-llcs/acc-stats/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
39. See Bill Pratt & Maureen Parsons, Partnership Returns, 2001, STAT. INCOME BULL. 46, 54
(Fall 2003), available at: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01partnr.pdf.
40. Id.
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FIGURE 3: INTERPOLATED FIRM LEVEL TAKEUP OF LLC FORMS
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At least as a benchmark for assessing the reception of BCs and
FPCs, the arc of the LLC uptake path suggests that the jury is (and
should be) decidedly out on the ultimate success of the new forms. They
have yet, for example, to develop a set of judicial precedents and regulatory rulings that would provide the same degree of comfort that LLCs
waited nearly two decades to receive.
C.

Assessing Uptake in California

Regardless of the arguably favorable comparison to historical LLC
uptake, or the relative success of California compared to other states,
advocates of the new corporate forms in California had likely hoped for a
more definitive California “bear hug” by new businesses, since the state
is an acknowledged hotbed of social entrepreneurship generally.41 If the
uptake of BCs and FPCs is indeed lower than hoped, what could be the
cause? Reasons for the low level of uptake could include the increased
risk investors and entrepreneurs associate with a brand new type of legal
entity, confusion over California’s two different social enterprise laws,
questions over the necessity of the new corporate form, and even opposition by the nonprofit community. This section looks briefly at each of
these potential reasons and how they contribute to the slow uptake.

41. See Deborah L. Cohen, Entrepreneurial Hotbeds: A Mix of Science and Luck, REUTERS
(Oct. 19, 2011, 12:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/19/us-column-cohen-hotbeds-idUST
RE79I4T120111019.
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Legal risk

Starting or investing in a business always includes an element of
risk, and determining the risk profile of a company and investment involves both sensitive analysis and personal judgment. Additional risk,
whether generated through a new right of action, a cash flow constraint,
or mere confusion, hurts the company’s prospects of finding investment.
For smaller companies, this could hamper their growth and prevent their
success; for larger companies, this could hurt their market position and
decrease overall firm value.
One source of risk is a new right of action created by BC laws and
the concomitant concern over litigation exposure.42 In California, as in
most other states that have enacted such a law, the BC form adds a new
right of action against the company’s board of directors for failure to adhere to the standards.43 One of the implications of the new right of action
is the possibility of a lawsuit brought against the company or the board of
directors for failure to adhere to the social purposes enumerated in the
company charter and the BC statute.44 As described by Ian Kanig, “if the
[board] makes a particular business decision that ultimately harms the
provision of public benefit, shareholders and (minority) directors could
file suit under the express private right of action set forth by the benefit
enforcement proceeding.”45 Although legally possible, a search of
Westlaw reveals that there has been but a single lawsuit citing to either
the BC or FPC laws, which indicates that there remain unsettled legal
and doctrinal issues around the new corporate entity.46
This risk is exemplified by “an additional procedural duty lurking
beneath the surface of the benefit corporation statute.”47 As Kanig argues, “each material action by the board of directors is capable of both
substantive and procedural review.”48 The substantive review analyzes a
particular business decision under the so-called business judgment rule,
which generally gives substantial protection to the board of directors.
The procedural review, however, “escapes the deference of the business
judgment rule” and requires “strict procedural liability” such that “the
board of directors must make some affirmative, evidentiary showing of
nonshareholder consideration for all material decisions.”49 This means
that if the company fails to adhere to the social purposes listed in the
statute and its charter, then a lawsuit could be brought against the com42. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14620–23 (West 2014).
43. Id. § 14623.
44. Id. § 14620(b).
45. Ian Kanig, Sustainable Capitalism Through the Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the Procedural
Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 898 (2013). See
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(b) for an explanation of the benefit enforcement proceeding.
46. Search done on November 15, 2013. The single case cite was irrelevant however, as it dealt
with a separate and unrelated issue.
47. Kanig, supra note 45, at 898.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 899.
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pany to force adherence. According to Kanig, the “plaintiffs in a benefit
enforcement proceeding should be able to restrain further corporate action” until the evidence is provided.50 In this way the procedural arm of
the benefit enforcement proceeding avoids the deference to the company
decision makers required by the business judgment rule.51 As such, this
factor likely increases the perceived litigation risk profile of BCs, contributing to the slow adoption of the new entity.
Unlike the BC model, the FPC model is a much more modest departure from conventional corporate law, and it creates no new right of
action, even though (as shown above) it has enjoyed relatively less popularity in California.52 While this may be in part due to the larger national
push that BCs have received through certifying groups such as B-Corp, it
also suggests that fear of legal exposure alone probably does not explain
takeup patterns.
2.

Cash Flow Demands

Another salient issue regarding new corporate forms is more general cash flow risk from business operations, including both demands on
expenditures as well as claims on earnings. Through our informal conversations with social entrepreneurs, investors, and lawyers, there remain
significant outstanding questions in the minds of even socially/environmentally oriented entrepreneurs about the cost implications
associated with becoming and maintaining a BC or a FPC. These questions might include:
• What direct costs will the social mission impose on operating
revenues?
• How much will it cost for the third party certification scheme?
• How much will it cost in additional materials, process, and
oversight to comply with the standards?
• How might the company change in a way that would harm its
investor interests?
• How does the corporation’s legal form affect investors’ exit
options (through acquisition, conversion, or public offering)?
Many investors facing these sorts of questions would balk at the
open ended nature of the costs, which they may not understand how to
calculate and the company may not be able to explain fully how to contain. The costs associated with fulfilling the third party certification and
adhering to the company’s mission, in addition to the certification fees
themselves, can quickly become overwhelming, adding thousands of dollars to the budgets of cash strapped startups or market sensitive companies. At a more unsentimental level, paying living wages costs more than

50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
See supra Figure 1.
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paying minimum wages, and postconsumer recycled paper is more expensive than ordinary paper.
While independent certification schemes are not new for corporations seeking to adhere to social, environmental, or human rights,53 the
new legal entities in California that codify social and environmental
standards—the BC and FPC—go further than other schemes.54 For companies large and small attempting to attract investors, the risk associated
with dedicating an unknown but significant portion of revenues—a cash
flow asset—to the social or environmental purpose and certification may
deter investors, which could further contribute to the perceived low uptake.
3.

Confusion

In addition to the increase in risk associated with new business
forms, the fact that California has two distinct new entities that purport
to accomplish the same goal adds confusion to the laws around social enterprises.55 One source of risk is the uncertainty of the longevity of these
corporate forms. While having more options is intuitively more desirable, sometimes a single scheme (and less choice) can better exploit network externalities, developing more quickly and more sensibly without
distraction from competing statutory forms. Advocates of each of the
laws highlight the differences and assert the need for both entities; however, entrepreneurs and investors may not want to face the choice given
the possibility that the entity they opt for may not survive. In a sense,
few have the taste for becoming a canary in the social enterprise
coalmine.
4.

Necessity

Compounding this uncertainty is the question of necessity. As
Kanig notes, the BJR, which governs most business decisions, is quite
deferential to the management and board of the company. The Revlon
duty, which requires a company to maximize the short term value of the
company, applies most saliently to public companies when the sale of a
company becomes inevitable and there is a change of control.56 Because
53. See, e.g., various schemes implementing the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights such as Social Accountability International (www.sa-intl.org) and Business for Social Responsibility (www.bsr.org), as well as older certification schemes such as the International Labor Organization (www.ilo.org), Fair Labor Association (www.fairlabor.org), Fairtrade International
(www.fairtrade.net), and Workers Rights Consortium (www.workersrights.org).
54. See, e.g., Kanig, supra note 45, at 892, 899–901.
55. See, e.g., John F. Olson, Two New Corporate Forms to Advance Social Benefits in California,
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Nov. 17, 2011, 10:23 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/11/17/two-new-corporate-forms-to-advance-social-benefitsin-california/.
56. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc, 571 A.2d 1140, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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there are no public BCs or FPCs,57 Revlon does not pose significant impediments to the BJR in this context, although it may apply with greater
force if ownership of these entities becomes more widely distributed.
Moreover, conventional corporate entities can often take advantage of
private contracting solutions to enshrine social missions—such as
through long term leases in which failure of the lessee to adhere to articulated social purposes can trigger automatic termination.
On the other hand, while the BJR gives the company flexibility to
pursue a social purpose, as noted above it does not require the company
to do so. Certain investors or entrepreneurs might want to bake the social purpose more completely into the company’s DNA so that future
boards and officers have little option but to adhere to it. It is possible to
accomplish this (at least in some measure) contractually, such as through
contracts and leases with third parties (or affiliated entities) that allow
for reversionary or march-in rights of the counterparty should the corporate entity stray from its social purpose. While this sort of approach has
gained some popularity of late, it entails somewhat elusive commitment
devices (e.g., if parties expect simply to renegotiate/reexecute the deal
after a termination event is triggered, the triggering clause would have
little deterrent effect). By opting into a BC or FPC structure, a business
entity makes a concrete commitment to a social purpose that is difficult
to back out of, finesse, or renegotiate, and some impact oriented investors or social entrepreneurs could well see this commitment device as a
necessity.
5.

Opposition

A final (albeit possibly overhyped) source of resistance to these new
corporate forms is opposition by the nonprofit and charitable communities. During the legislative debates around AB 361 (the BC bill) and SB
201 (the FPC bill) there was testimony and opposition by several nonprofit advocacy organizations.58 After passage, there has continued to be
tension between the two groups. In 2012 in San Francisco, for example,
proposed legislation to incentivize BCs was opposed to by the California
Association of Nonprofits (“CAN”).59 CAN’s chief executive officer has
repeatedly questioned the need to provide “nonprofit-like preferences”
and advantages to for-profit companies that are not legally required to
adhere to “nonprofit-like restrictions and oversight.”60 This conflict be57. See uptake data from Talley, supra note 1.
58. See, e.g., AB361 Bill Analysis prepared for Assembly Committee On Judiciary Hearing, May
3, 2011, p.2, (regarding opposition by California Association of Nonprofits), available at http://
www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_361_cfa_20110502_125826_asm_comm.html
(last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
59. See, e.g., Mark Hrywna, Benefit Corporation in California Meets Chill in San Francisco, NON
PROFIT TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/benefit-corporationin-california-meets-chill-in-san-francisco/ (citing opposing statements by the California Association of
Nonprofits).
60. Id.
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tween the charitable community and the social enterprise community has
dampened the enthusiasm around the new corporate forms and perhaps
contributed to the sluggish uptake.
There are many other factors that contribute to the underwhelming
rate of uptake of BCs and FPCs. The combination of increased risk
around litigation, legal duties, and cash flow, as well as confusion between the two entities, questions around the necessity of the new forms,
and opposition by the nonprofit community, creates a thick restraint
around their development and spread. Despite this, however, there is, in
fact, cause for hope that these new corporate forms will see an increasing
rate of uptake—as with the rise of the LLC, underwhelming initial uptake does not necessarily portend failure.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have taken Larry Ribstein’s pioneering lead in
the analysis of alternative business forms to take a critical look at the rise
of new social enterprise corporate forms. We have demonstrated that
while firm level uptake appears modest in absolute numbers, and opposition and questions about necessity persist in segments of the business and
nonprofit communities, the comparison to the emergence of the LLC is
revealing. There has been a far more rapid increase of states that have
enacted social entrepreneurship forms in contrast to the rather slow
adoption of the now-ubiquitous LLC form: since Maryland adopted the
first socially responsible corporate form in 2010, over half of states have
followed suit. In addition, much of the confusion caused by competing
forms (the Benefit Corporation and the Flexible Purpose Corporation) is
dissipating as the two forms move closer together as in, for example, the
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation. And even at the firm level, the
rate of uptake into these new forms compares quite favorably to the
LLC. Furthermore, the consumer support of these laws lends credibility
to the conclusion that these new corporate forms are here to stay. Although the economic impact may never be as great as that of the LLC,
these new forms may well help invigorate the nation’s nascent social enterprise economy. At the very least, they deserve a spot in the policy
conversation that we shall carry on in Professor Ribstein’s absence.
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